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The recent publication of Michael Thompson's Labor Without Class
and Katherine Betts' The Great Divide l has re-focussed attention upon
claims that there exists a powerful "new class" in Australian society
comprised of tertiary-educated, left-wing activist intellectuals, trade
unionists, public servants and lobbyists. This paper provides a
background to the thesis of the new class, arguing that it constitutes
the central organising idea of a new class discourse, which
encompasses such ideas as 'political correctness', 'special interests'
and the 'guilt industry'. Both the thesis of the new class and new
class discourse are key discursive and conceptual features of
contemporary right-wing political thought in Australia. As rhetorical
devices employed in the context of the hegemonic struggles within
Australian society of the 1990s, new class discourse de-legitimates
the interests of the labour movement and other social movements,
thus working to exclude these groups from the sphere of public
discourse and the legitimate political community.
From the late nineteenth century and throughout the twentieth
century, the tenn "new class" has been used by many divergent writers
and in many different contexts. 2Bakunin, for example predicted that
a Marxist revolution would result in:
the reign of scientific intelligence ... a new class, a new hierarchy of
real and pretended scientists and scholars ... of the State engineers
who will constitute the new privileged scientific-political class.'
John Kenneth Galbraith used the term to apply to the rise of a
non-labouring educated knowledge class in America4 and in the
1950s, 1960s and 1970s a number of left-wing Eastern European
dissidents such as Milovan Djilas and Ivan Szelenyi, used the term
to refer to the domination of the European Communist states by a
Communist Party-based bureaucratic eliteS. However, in order to
understand the contemporary manifestation of the idea of the new
class within the Australian Right, it is first necessary to examine its
historical heritage amongst the American neo-conservative
intellectuals during the early 1970s. The term neo-conservative refers
to a specific group of American intellectuals - such as Daniel Bell,
Irving Kristol, Nathen Glazier, Norman Podhoretz and Daniel Patrick
Moynihan - who, during the 1960s and 1970s, articulated a particular
type of Cold War anti-communist conservatism. This motivated the
neo-conservatives, on the one hand, to critique what was seen as a
failure of American liberalism - which resulted in the radicalism of
the 1960s and challenges to the authority of major institutions of
American society - but on the other hand to defend the cultural and
political institutions which, they perceived, formed the foundations
of American liberal democracy.
The thesis of the new class became a central component of this
neo-conservative project. 6 In 1971 and 1972, a number of articles
appeared in the journals Commentary and The Public Interest - which
continue to be key sites for the articulation of neo-conservative
thought - expounding the idea ofthe new class. The theme of these
articles was that a "new class" of the fonner educated professional
middle class had grown and was continuing to grow in the United
States. This class was politically to the left, antagonistic towards the
major and traditional institutions of American society and using its
dominance within the public sphere to pursue its own interests
at the expense of the national or public interests.1

Even if members of the new class believed that they were working
in the best interests of the public, it is argued that the general appeal
of the new class to the public interest is a mask for sectional interests.
The neo-conservative authors attribute to the new class a particularly
"aggressive"8 and "self-righteous"9 style of political discourse and,
importantly, stress the lack of empathy and cynicism displayed by
the new class towards the common American worker. Although there
were differences in accounting for precisely who belongs to this "new
class" (the term is variously used to refer to "self-designated
intellectuals",lo employees of the public welfare sector and their trade
unions ll and "educated, prosperous people, members of the
professional and technical intelligentsia, and their wives and children,
academics and their students"12) all the authors demonstrated
antipathy towards it.
These ideas recurred throughout the 1970s and 1980s not only
in Commentary and The Public Interest, but also in neo-conservative
books, anthologies and other publications. I' The new class thesis
formed that basis for a critique of sixties radicalism as well as policy
proposals aimed at promoting equality of outcome and opportunity
within American society.
This thesis proved influential amongst Australian right wing
intellectuals. 14 The first major article by the Australian right that used
the term new class appears to be Bob Browning's 'Opposition
business fails to see' printed in The Bulletin in November 1981. In
it, Browning argues that a new class is developing in Australia, similar
to that identified by the American neo-conservatives in the United
States. Browning's new class is anti-capitalist in intent, highly
organised and existing within public institutions; in this article, he
attempts to ground the actions of the new class within the structures
of "post-industrial capitalism", arguing that it is in the interests of
the new class to attack private enterprise in order to legitimate their
own positions within the public sphere. To Browning, the major site
of anti-capitalist organisation in the late twentieth century has shifted
from blue collar trade unions to the white collar professional publicly
employed middle class:
... commercially non-productive white collar sections of the
community which are the bastions of welfare agencies, tertiary
education institutions and the more obscurely functioning sections
of the Public service. IS
By 1983, it seems, the idea of the new class had gained a
substantial following amongst the Australian Right, as is evidenced
by Robert Manne's impromptu speech at the launch of The New
Conservatism in Australia:
... by the mid-seventies another layer had been added [to Australian
societyJ... the so-called "new class" of university graduates, the
products ofthe rapidly expanded tertiary education of the 'sixties.
They were now present throughout many of the key institutions of
our society, and were dominant in those - like teaching and
journalism - where moral and social values were defined and
disseminated. Their enthusiasms, certainties and causes were
everywhere to be found. Their hatreds - America, Capitalism, Moral
Puritanism, Anti-Communism - were expressed rancorously and
consensually. 16
During the 1980s and 1990s, the thesis of the new class

has been employed across the spectrum of right-wing thought; by
conservatives such as Santamaria and Coleman, 17 economic liberals
such as McGuinness,18 from within the Labor Party by Peter Walsh
and Michael Thompson l9 as well as by the extreme-Right populist
supporters of Pauline Hanson. 20
The thesis of the new class gave cohesion to ideas that had been
fermenting amongst the Australian Right for a number of years.
Firstly, it tapped into already existing sympathies and antagonisms
and provided a structural explanation for some ofthe major changes
that Australian society had experienced during the 1960s and 1970s,
specifically the campus radicalism of the 1960s, the role of
intellectuals in post-World War Two Western society. Secondly, it
complimented core ideas ofthe growing economic liberal world view.
Like the American neo-conservatives, many within the Australian
Right were concerned with providing an explanation for the campus
radicalism of the 1960s. Conservatives were critical of what they
perceived as an irrational and indulgent rejection of the traditional
authority of Australia's individualistic, capitalist British heritage. The
protest movement against the Vietnam War, the Springbok tour of
Australia and campus radicalism in general were explained in these
terms. John Carroll, for example, explains the radicalism ofthe sixties
in terms of a failure of the traditional structures of authority, resulting
in the middle class university students identifying with the "larger
than life" New Left figures such as Mao Tse Tung and Che GuevaraY
As is evident from the earlier statement by Manne, the generation of
campus radicals who graduated from universities around Australia
in the 19608 and early 1970s, taking their radical ideologies with
them into the institutions of the public service, the media, academia
and trade unions, is viewed as the constituting the beginning of the
new class. Lachlan Chipman's discussion of the New South Wales
Teachers' Federation anticipates this new class thesis:

Keynesian state from a perspective of the primacy of the freedom of
the individual. Its set of policy proposals have revolved around deregulation of government services, privatisation and an attack upon
the power of trade unions. The underlying premises ofthe economicliberal world view variously derive their inspiration, if not theoretical
basis from such thinkers as Friederich von Hayek, James Buchanan
and the Public Choice School, and Milton Friedman25 . A brief
examination of the work of these thinkers reveals that the thesis of
the new class is complimentary to their arguments.
The project of the Public Choice School has been referred to by
many of its adherents as the "politics of economics".26 It is an
application ofthe principles ofneo-classical economics to the field
of political inquiry and relies upon a view of the individual as a
utility maximizer, who pursues this utility maximization rationally.
Tullock and Buchanan transpose this view of the individual onto
governmental structures, such as governmental departments and
regulatory authorities. 27 Thus, bureaucratic activity is reduced to the
self-interest of powerful bureaucrats. Mancur Olson also critiques
group political activity, theorising that large groups are unable to
represent the interests of their members, despite what claims may be
made by them to the contrary.28 Similarly, von Hayek argues that,
contrary to the pronouncements made by governments and supporters
of Keynesian style state intervention, governments are unable to
satisfy the multitude of demands and preferences of its citizens, and
indeed are unable to ascertain what these preferences might be. 29
Thus, these economic liberal theories echo the themes, later
articulated within the new class thesis, of the growth of self-serving
interest groups and bureaucracies, typically funded by public money.
Milton and Rose Friedman, in fact, acknowledge their debt to the
American neo-conservatives and use the term "new class" to refer
to:

On a typically hot and humid Sydney evening late in 1980, the
audience for the ABC's major television news service watched an
angry group of unionists shouting, or more precisely swearing, at
the latest salary recommendation of the new South Wales Industrial
Relations Commission ... viewers saw and heard a foul-mouthed
rabble of sloppily dressed and grubbily obese unionists ... its
leadership currently is very much more to the left, and militantly so,
than most of the others. It embodies the ideological divisions of the
far left, and is increasingly under the control of the 'new left'
generation which demonstrated, occupied, defied, confronted, and
in many cases, cheated its way through Australian universities and
colleges of higher education in the late 1960s and early 1970s. 22

... government bureaucrats, academics whose research is supported
by government funds or who are employed in government financed
'think-tanks', staffs of the many so-called' general interest' or 'public
policy' groups, journalists and others in the communications
industry.30

As the intellectual mentors to the generation of campus radicals,
intellectuals too have been apportioned blame for the failure of
traditional authority represented by the sixties. In 1974, John J. Ray
put this position regarding intellectuals:
It is their students who go out and fill jobs in the public service and
the media. Many business leaders and politicians who supposedly
represent the worker are nowadays university graduates. So after
three or more years indoctrination, it is no wonder that people who
have been through university think that the only intellectually
defensible opinions are radical ones. 23
This sentiment built upon earlier critiques of intellectuals as being
sympathetic towards communism. 24 During the Vietnam War, this
resulted in the criticism being levelled at many left-wing academics
that they were blind to the atrocities of communist regimes, yet were
prepared to criticise vehemently the governments of their own
countries.
The rise of economic liberalism within the Right also
provided a space for the articulation of the new class thesis.
Economic liberalism is concerned with critiquing the

These approaches to economics and politics formed the intellectual
core of the growing collection of adherents to economic-liberalism
within Australia. 31
Thus the new class thesis was able to be accommodated within
the intellectual milieu of the Australian Right in the early to mid
eighties. It complemented both the conservative and the neo-liberal
world view in Australia. For the neo-liberal, it provided a historical
framework for the critique of the role of the state and interest groups
in Australian society, for the conservative it offered an explanation
for the changes and conflicts in Australian cultural attitudes and
institutions that were occurring by the mid-l 98Gs. During the 1980s
and into the nineteen nineties, one of the defining features of rightwing political discourse in Australia has been the sometimes bitter
conflict between, broadly, economic liberalism and liberal
conservatism.32 Despite this conflict, the new class thesis, although
predominantly employed by conservatives, has been accommodated
within both world views.

New class discourse
The importance of the new class thesis lies beyond its specific
articulation,by various thinkers on the right. The concept of the new
class informs a number of critiques of the state, intellectuals, new
social movements and trade unions. Indeed, it forms the central
organising concept of a new class discourse that includes such
rhetorical devices as "political correctness", "special
interests", the "guilt industry" and the "industrial relations

club" that has become one of the defining features of contemporary
right-wing political culture in Australia. New class discourse is a
specific set of rhetorical devices and associated concepts which
provides a framework within which the claims about the rights of
workers, women, the environment and minorities such as Aborigines
are explained and critiqued.
"Political correctness" is the most successful popular
manifestation of new class discourse. Although originally fonnulated
as an ironic term within the American new left33 , "political
correctness" became a key rhetorical feature of the American Right's
portrayal of a "crisis" on US university campuses which revolved
around an ideological struggle, where radical left-wing, feminist,
gay and minority academics (the fonner radicals of the sixties),
having gained control of departments, faculties and administrations,
disregarded the ideals of traditional American education and abused
their power to foist their own ideology upon the young minds of
America. 34 As with the thesis of the new class, the rhetoric and
associated concepts behind "political correctness" were translated
into the context of the Australian Right. The terms "political
correctness" and "PC" have come to be applied to what is portrayed
as a domination of public discourse by tertiary educated left-wing
minorities whose opinions do not reflect those of mainstream
Australia35 , and this theme has been popularised through the mass
media.
In the concept of "special interests", also, is the underlying notion
of the new class. The tenn has been used particularly with reference
to those groups who are perceived to have had power in influencing
the agenda of the Hawke and Keating Labor governments; groups
such as non-profit or quasi non-government organisations promoting
such interests as feminism, multiculturalism, Aboriginal rights and
environmentalism. 36 The tenn itself conveys the sense that these
interests are distant from the concerns of mainstream Australia, that
they have had a 'special' power with relation to policy makers and
that those who promote such special interests, view theirs as deserving
of more attention than other interests, rights or knowledge claims.
Significantly, since forming government, John Howard has used the
idea of "special interests" as a key concept in his rhetorical arsenal
against the trade union movement. In the context of the Coalition
government's ongoing process of industrial relations changes, the
trade union leadership have been labelled as "special interests", and
indeed, these special interests of the trade union leadership are
equated with demands of the trade union movement (i.e. the demands,
claims and campaigns of trade unions are reducible to the interests
of the union leadership. )37 Similarly, the concept of the "guilt
industry" is one which was articulated within right-wing political
culture during the 1980s, and currently fonns a part of the rhetorical
arsenal of the Coalition government. 38 The tenn reflects the twin
notions of middle class guilt and the economic self-interest of those
employed on public money as advocates for Aboriginal people as
being the primary motivating forces for contemporary advocacy of
issues such as Aboriginal land rights.
As will be argued later, one of the strengths of the new class
thesis is its lack of specificity, enabling it to be applied in a number
of different contexts. This discursive strength is also its analytical
weakness. Firstly, there is little agreement as to who precisely is a
member of this new class. Is it, "... those commercially nonproductive white collar sections of the community which are the
bastions of welfare agencies, tertiary education institutions and the
more obscurely functioning sections of the Public Service."39? Is it
" ... teachers, social workers, reformist lawyers (including those
working in, and on, aboriginal communities), planners of
various types, basically ... those who are already on a
government payroll"40? Does it extend into the private sphere,

as McGuinness suggests41 ? The major analytical failing of the new
class thesis is that the key detenninant of new class membership is
not to be found in social location, but rather in ideological orientation.
Ironically, it this quasi-Marxist conception of class consciousness
that is used to define the new class. As Daniel Bell concludes in his
reflection upon the new class thesis:
In short, if there is any meaning to the idea of a "new class" ... it
cannot be located in social structural tenns; it must be found in
cultural attitudes. It is a mentality, not a class. 42
For the notion of class to have meaning requires that membership
criterion of that class be applied universally within social stratas. It
is clear that across any particular strata that could come under the
label of 'new class', there are many who do not share the key
ideological characteristics ascribed to them (for example, across the
public service, within teacher unions, within the trade union
leadership or within the professional middle class).
Therefore, in the context of the new class thesis, the term "class",
is, it seems, a convenient rather than descriptive label. It suggests
collusion, individual self-interest and group self-interest; ideas that
are also implicit in the tenns "special interests" and "guilt industry".
Thus, what are really at stake in tenns of the new class thesis, and
indeed the discourse of the new class, are not claims about a class,
but rather claims about an elite, and crucially, an elite with a particular
ideological character. The ideological character of these elites is leftwing and vehemently opposed to both traditional Australian values
and the present values of mainstream Australia. Policies emanating
from these elites are derived from the elites' interest in furthering
their own privilege, and they are elites because they wield political
power- relative to the power of the people they represent-through
their organisational positions or by being agenda-setters within the
public service, the media and government.
Although there is not the space within this article to offer a
thorough critique ofthe claims ofthe new class discourse, a number
of areas for further exploration can be suggested which, if correct,
undennine its major contentions. Firstly, the discourse itself deserves
attention. As a discourse, it is self-referential, and little empirical
evidence is used to justify knowledge claims within the discourse. It
is also inconsistent in that terms such as new class, political
correctness and special interests are applied arbitrarily to many
different and disparate individuals and ideas. Boris Frankel puts it
succinctly when he writes;
Culturally, 'new class' is a synonym for class betrayal, hedonistic
narcissism and nihilism. Structurally, it is a synonym for all that
inhibits economic growth and the development of Australia as a
market society. Politically it is a synonym for those social forces
which, eiectorally, the major parties cannot afford to offend, despite
the fact that they are supposedly subverting society.
In other words, 'new class' is a shorthand code for a range of rightwing attitudes towards the welfare state, contemporary culture,
Australian history and national identity, Aboriginal rights, feminism,
environmentalism and multiculturalismY
The problems and inconsistencies with the term "political
correctness" for example are well documented. 44
Secondly, the claims implicit within the discourse must be
evaluated. There is a sense in which the underlying claims of new
class discourse do have resonance, and that is in the make up of the
leadership ofthe new social movements, Labor Party and trade unions
- however the discourse obfuscates a thorough understanding of the
phenomenon. Burgmann and Milner, for example, describe the ways
in which the leadership of the new social movements are
dominated by the middle class, and to a large extent, express
middle class interests. 45 Importantly, it is the material interests

~~--------------------------of the middle class which Burgmann and Milner are referring to,
rather than the radical anti-capitalist agenda ascribed to the new class.
It is possible to take this analysis further and evaluate the new social
movements as well as the labour movement in terms of radical
agendas and radical policy outcomes. The appropriateness of the
term special interests in relation to the environment movement, for
example, deserves attention. For whilst this movement undoubtedly
contains individuals and groups who profess a radical anti-capitalist
and anti-materialist agenda, the concrete policy initiatives which
reflect such an agenda are minimal. Further, like other social
movements, it is a diverse movement accommodating vastly different
ideologies and approaches to politics. Thus, as Christopher Lasch
writes, it can be concluded that:
The hope that "new social movements" would take its place in the
struggle against capitalism, which briefly sustained the left in the
late seventies and early eighties, has come to nothing. Not only do
the new social movements - feminism, gay rights, welfare rights,
agitation against racial discrimination - have nothing in common,
but their only coherent demand aims at inclusion in the dominant
structures rather than at a revolutionary transformation of social
relations. 46
Similarly, the role of the trade unions under the Hawke and
Keating Labor governments can be evaluated against the claims about
the power of the radical special interests of labour. As Matthews
argues, major employer groups were successful in transforming the
agenda of the Accord to one supportive of a shift towards enterprise
bargaining. 47 The Accord tied the trade union movement into a role
of responsible consultant to government and thus into a period
characterised by consensus rather than confrontation on the part of
the unions. 48 Such a strategy allowed the ALP to maintain its trade
union base of financial and electoral support as well as shedding its
socialist image in favour of an image as responsible and equitable
managers of a capitalist economy,,9 As Paul Kelly writes:
Australia's political debate during the late 1980s saw Labor and
Coalition, business and unions, opinion makers and economic
institutions, agreed upon the direction - the need for a more
competitive, flexible, high saving economy, less reliant upon state
regulation, border protection and arbitral machinery. The real division
was about the timing, income redistribution and methodology of the
transformation. 50

The "new class" and the "guilt industry" connote the collusion and
power of a minority at the expense of the majority. New class
discourse thus re-works the classical Australian image of the 'battlers
versus the elites'. 54 In doing this, it positions trade unions, new social
movements, and others critical of conservative and neo-Iiberal
agendas, outside of the mainstream. The effect is to de-legitimate
the knowledge claims of these groups. What constitutes the legitimate
political community then, is defined through a process of exclusion.
With the forums of public discourse increasingly monopolised
by large corporate interests, the question of who speaks on behalf of
the Australian community, and which communitys' voices and
interests are represented is a pertinent one. For the labour movement,
it is carries a particular immediacy. As Gramsci demonstrates,
ideological leadership is a necessary element of any hegemonic
process, and it is precisely this kind of leadership which is being
pursued by John Howard and the Coalition government in the context
of their industrial relations agenda. 55 As the claims of trade unions
are de-legitimated through the discourse of the new class, it is the
image of the individual worker, who will be able to profit, free form
the stifling interests of the trade union leadership under a system of
Australian Workplace Agreements, that is promoted by the federal
government. This hegemonic project undermines an identification
of Australian workers with the labour movement in favour of
individualism and an identification with the vague, but antithetical
image of the battler.
The new class is an imprecise term at best; at worst it is arbitrary.
But it is this imprecision which allows it to be mobilised in different
contexts. As this discourse de-legitimates knowledge claims and the
rights claims oflabour, social movements and minority groups within
Australian society, it narrows the scope ofiegitimate public discourse.
In doing this it also narrows the scope of the political community,
and contributes to an impoverished rather than a vibrant democratic
society.
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